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Prefcce 
I would like to expres s  my indebtedn e ss to 
the f aoul ty of Illinois Wesleyan Uni versi ty fa r 
pre se nting iD me the OppOI tuni ty to wri te an 
honors paper. 
The initial interest in the field of religious 
language stems from lectures on �The Meaning of 
ReI! gious LanguE�gefl which y�ere pres en ted by Profes SOT 
Paul Hessert. These lectures were given in the 
Philosophy of Religion c ourse offerfed in the spring 
of 1961. 
I would also like to thank Professor John 
Vander'v'Vaal, cha.irman of t..L e F):lilosophy Department 
at Wesleyan, for his personal gUidance and encouragement 
during' the prep2.r2tion of this papar . Under �.is 
direction the Buck Memorial Libra ry is rapidly 
attempting to compensate for its great deficiency 
in source materiEl pertcdning to tili s subj ect. 
Appreci2tion is also due to those ce:rt·qin 
professors in vcriou8 fields, who by their earnest 
concern for },:nowlecige and fine schole.rship 2 .. 8 
exhibited in their classroom, inspire many students 
to plunge i nto an undertaking whic h from the inception 
these 
individuals eludes an adequate expression. 
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..i. . 
From the mom e nt of conc eption, the organism d esign-
" 
2 .. ted by the Greek term II�Y0l'wtfO$" is invol veLl in a 
process 01 growing into a compl ex and highly dev eloped 
structure. The instant the egg: and sperm unite, a 
zygote is formed and an individual is e ng ag ed in being 
or existe nce. Every b e ing of nec es sity must resDond to 
his existence. Man's response comprize s  his lif e, and 
his life is what he exp eri ences. Every man lought' to 
l ive i n  an awareness of his state of affairs - the human 
condition of an exi sting being. Ind e e d, from th e incept-
i on of thi S peper' , presupposi ti ons ar e pres ented, but this 
should not appeEr unreasonable. The expli ci t essu!'f1ption 
is that man's life or response to his existence concerns 
man's attempt to be an eXistentially authentic bei Man 
as a being engaged in existence is preoccupied with the 
meaning of existenoe, S existence. 
T n man's ultimate response is to orientate imsclf 
to the cosmos. It is not adequate, according to Mirc�a 
Eliade, for man to s imp ly say that he is in the world or 
If just here". r esponse is made only 
which ve;etEtee, not an 2uthentic being. Once ain, 
the explicit and implicit assumption of this r�per is 
that man , in full awareness of his state of being, 
n ecessarily s e eks to orientate himself to the cosmos; 
this eXistential concern i8 for a directed existence, 
an B.uthentic being. 
2. 
As this distinct being evolves, he continually 
attempts to orientate himself i n  his existence ih a 
m eaningful manner. When anything becomes meaningful, 
mom inevitably tries to communicate that which he 
understands as being the answer to authentic existence. 
Simultaneously with the development of man's 
social re12.tions, linguistic communice.tion plays B.D 
increasingly important role. Language, as a means of 
comrnunication, not only e.ssists in the c12.rification 
of our own thoughts but serves as a means of commun-
ica ting our idea .. s to others. We can therefore see 
that language is an integral part of social existence. 
Langua�e is a priceless possession that must be 
employed with a conscious effort to use it properly. 
If our efforts to use language precisely deteriorate, 
our ability to communicate with meaning and c12rity 
will greatly. diminish. An essential "dialogue" w·ill 
thereby be lost to the ages, and a significant part 
of our meaningful existence will also be sacrificed. 
These thoughts introduce us immediately to the 
concern of this paper. We need to ask ourselves if 
our concepts c2tch hold of and convey the meanings 
we intend to communicate, i.e. are our linguistic 
B.ppE'ra tUB rooted in the re�1 i ty we seek to know, 
. 
, 
� 
th .. !�."t real,_'ty 
to others. ( l) 
and do tt1ey COR11lmnlC8.l.Je --
Ludwig Wittgenstein implies a similar, yet more 
emphati c consideration when he states, "In propositions 
there must be exactly as much distinguished ( Gleich 
soviel zu unterscheiden ) as in the state of affairs 
that it represents.n ( 2 ) Language cannot be discussed 
without involving the facts to which they refer. 
Semantics and ontology 2.re the ([;a1n 2,reas to be invest-
igated. Another preliminary co nsideration is that the 
very nature of that which is known is irdi cated by the 
approach to bnd solution of these problems. This 
contemporary concern cannot an� uust not be glossed 
over lightly by anyone who would be and think as a 
philosopher or theologian in the realms of scholar-
Due to the influence end questions being raised 
by the proponents of philosophical movements associate d  
,d t h  lingui etic analysi s, the validity of theological 
statements is being questionec .. Someone mIl attempt 
to answer these questions, and it would be preferable 
if there would be a feasible response from within the 
discipline being att2�cked. In E� previous p2.per, I 
have tri eo to expla.in why le.nguage is the bat tleground 
of Twentieth Century philosophy. The purpose of this 
paper is to inquire into the cognitive i ications 
o f  theolog'ical langu2cge, and wi thin this undertaking 
4. 
to xecogni ze any c h a nge in the txadi ti ona.l functi on of 
philosophy. 
It was a little over a half-century ago that 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) spoke his prophetic 
words through the character of Zarathustra. Zarathustra 
came down from the mountain "satiated with wisdom" and 
"descended into the lower world" in order that he might 
save mankind. Zarathustrafs proclamation that God is 
dead is mild compared to the prophetic voices of the 
"doing" philosophers of today, Briefly, their 
Z arathustra vyoulc. state that theolog'ical language is 
dead, traditional philosophy is dead, and philosophy 
is functione.l only as a linguistic theraphy. If the 
philosopher can clarify the different usages of 
language, man will be better able to understand what 
claims are being made by a certain la.nguage. 
The claims made through religious language are 
the i terns that confront every individual e,nd require 
a response from him. In general, all religious claims 
to fact incorporate and procls.im an understanding in 
2� lerger dirnension than the stclndard spacio-temporal 
reference. The religious claim is that there is in 
every y:lc'cn a soul thcJt is answerC'.ble to God, This 
realm irresistably confronts every auther:tically 
existing being. In addition to this most basic 
5. 
consideration, there are the implioit claims to kno.� 
ledge. All xeligious lengu8.ge involves an existential 
knowledge about life or an individual's being. Secondly, 
religious language entails a cognition of the cosmos as 
an integrated whole. Lastly, religious language claims 
a knowledge of the way life C8.n be orientated to and 
in tegrated with the cosmos. An example of the first 
implication is st. Augustinets brief s tatement, "Our 
heart cannot find rest 'until it has found Thee." ( The 
full ramifications of the existential knowledge confess­
e d  in this statement Can only be realized and under­
s tood by a more thorough accuaintance with the main 
tenets of Ohristianity. ) A Taoists principle 
illustrates the second' claim to knowledge. Tao, the 
cosmic energy, created the cosrnos. Thereby, Tao 
creates "the way to go" and the physical universe is 
forrned in 8. proper and distinct way or channel. The 
third claim is clearly expressed by Buddha's teach-
i ng of the Law of Karma. If an individual will 
follow the "Middle P2.tb", he may advance to a higher 
existence in his next birth. Kprma, the inevitable 
jUdgement of sins which determines your next exist­
ence, is a prin C iple of j ustice that deals with manls 
relationship to the cosmos. In conclusion, religious 
statements proclaim the knowledge of a r�ality above 
this material realm. This higher reality has nervading 
results in the existence of every human being. The 
fulfillment of life or the meaning of one's life comes 
with the establishment of this relationship of life 
with the cosmos. ( 3 ) 
These religious claims pOint to and attempt to 
express the being of a higher reality, a reality that 
is absolute and ultimate. T:lis religious concern for 
the ultimate involves on�ls total response. Karl 
Barth expresses the belief that this subjective search 
is an encounter with the objective, ultimate reality. 
For Barth, this is the historical Jesus of Nazareth 
who is the Christ. Therefore, theologi cal language 
i s  not simply �ubjective, whimsic al postulations, but 
refers to a concrete reality to which an existential 
being passionately responds. 
At this point our discussion is progressing 
toward statements uealing with re ality or being. For 
the theologian this confrontation with the problem of 
reality entails ontological implications. Turning our 
attention in em ontological direction introduces us to 
a perennial prDblem of philosophy. Tradi tionally the 
problem of reality nas been handled by ph ilo sophy 
uno.er the ti tIe of metap�lysics. MetaphYBics has been 
broken into three categories: ontology, epistemology, 
7. 
2nd axiology. The term "metaphysicsl! WB.S coined by 
the Romans to describe the type of writings that 
followed Aristotle's book called Physics. Thus the 
preposi tion .ll..f::TL (II after" ) was prefixed to Physics 
to designate any similar writings. 
When Paul Ti1lich eli scusses this aspect of 
philosophy he believes that it is less misleading to 
speak of ontology than of metaphysics. Tillich suggests 
that Vfe II call philosophy that cog-ni ti ve approach to 
reality in which reality as such is the object. Reality 
as such, or reality as a whole, is not the whole of 
reali ty; it is the structure which m akes reall ty a 
whole and therefore, a potential objeot of knowledge. 
Inquiring into the nat ure of reality as such means 
inquiring into those structures, categories, and 
concepts which are presupposed in the cognitive enco unter 
with every realm of reality.II(4) 
It is apparent for Tillich that the character of the 
general structures th at make experience possible involves 
Jhe philosophic8l question. Reference is here made to 
T illich beceuee :18 !.lost adequately. exp12.ins that when 
tbe religious stB.tements express a, cls.im to }::,no'wledge, 
the statements C'.re inextric2.bly bound-up in the 
ontological question. Since kno'wing is' an act thc.t 
particip2tes in being, i. e, 2.D It orctic relationfl, 
o. 
the analys i s of the act of knovdng mus t refer to an 
interpretation of being. Understanding this issue, 
we can readily see the friction between Tillich's 
ideas and those of contemporary ligui sti c analysi s ts to 
abandon ontology. Tillich's answer is very clear. Any 
answer to the relE tion of signs or logical ,operations to 
reality involves a statement about the "structure of 
being. " Therefore, all statements as to cognitive 
claims should express their fundamental ontological 
assumptions. In conclusion, we should not look on 
ontology as a subj ective stab in the dark at " the 
world behind the world. " Theological statements are 
directly concerned with an analysis of those structures 
of being which we experience in our everyday, every 
moment involvement with reality. ( 5 ) 
In order to establish the idea of an absolute 
structure more firmly in our minds, we need only 
investigate ti.1e Milesian school's sea.rch for the ¢V(f'IS­
that which is primary, fundamental, and persistent, 
what is natural or �iven. The three Ionian 
philosophers, Theles, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, 
respect i velybE:'l i eyed w2cter, a<..tfE IfOY ( the boundless ) l 
and air to be the principle of all things. These 
philosophers initiated a tradition search for the 
absolute, not the relative or secondary substances. 
Again in The Republi.,Q , Socrates, in his maieutic 
fashion, wasn't simply for subjective opinions con-
cerning the meaning of II justicelf• Polem2�rchos t con-
ventional definition or Thracymarchos' radical sophist 
definition of "justice" were insufficient; they weren't 
founded in an absolute structure. 
Granted that theology is necessarily confronted 
·wi th the on tological question, we need to consciously 
ask whet£1er Tillich explains it clec.rly by saying that 
which confronts us ultimately must be being if we are 
to be confronted by and concerned with this reality. 
He also proposes that this being must be our ground of 
being or the unconditional nower of being. More 
emphatically he states that this "being itselflf 
expresses itself in and through the structures of 
being.II(6) After having briefly stated Tillich's 
ontologicel viewpoint, we will gain additional under-
stanc5.ing by a further explanati on of ontological 
s tructures. 
Everett W. H all , in his article entitled 
"Metaphysicsfl, suggests thc:.t the present degrac1etion 
of metaphysics is a result of the prevailing emphasis 
on action and doing something directly and immediately. 
In reply, Hall states that metaphysics indirectly plays 
a vi tal s h Ere in directing pr0f!�res8 by II s h aDing vlews 
lC. 
a8 to what natur e  is and how it can and ought to be 
cont rolled, by indicating the proper ends.,, ( 7 ) The 
second c riticism of metaphysiCS is illuminated by 
exp12cining that Dewey's attempt to make thought the 
instrument of activity is still based upon metaphysical 
a ssumptions. The enterprise of metaphysiCS is also 
a ttacked because of its iligh degree of generali ty. Any 
assumption on the part of specialists to the effect 
that generalit y leads to unrealiability and thus to a 
futile inquiry as to its t ruth; is in itself based 
upon metaphysical foundations. 
In our thinking, actions, and communication, all 
people respond a ccording to assumptions bS.sed upon 
their experiences. Undergirding our intention to 
communicate OUI' exj_stential situations to others, 
there is the ve r y basic assumption that there is an 
objective, common nature to all cases of knowledge 
and also to all existents. ( S ) We thus affirm by our 
existence that \ve believe in a "common natu re to 
existence" in the entities which we suppose to exist 
and that it is ob jective to our action and response; 
and most iu�ortant, it is objective to even our 
language. Such universal constants the scholzstics 
refe rred to as "t ranscendentals." This reference did 
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not imply that s uch existent s transcended all experience, 
but rather it was expressing the conviction that t hese 
existents were a constant factor in each and every 
experience. Mircea Eliade would add that this 
transcendental element is the s acred as contrasted with 
the profane. If we ca� once establish t his point, we 
c an then proceed to the problem of expr essing the 
experience of existents in meaningful language or 
meaningful sentence structures. Hall believes that a 
meaningful statement referring to universal constants 
"excludes symbolic expressions in their referential 
a spect ( though not as facts ) ." ( 9 ) Unfort unately he does 
not explain why only obj ecti ve language as described by 
the logical posi ti vists is aCCelJtable. (AI though l"ve 
are sti l l  involved with the inception of this paper, 
this is the very point we s hall be trying t o  clarify. 
Relig10us stf.tements as symbolic statements are referring 
t o  an ob jective eXistentJ 
Metaphysici ans have traditionally made claims 
concerning the nature of icnowledge Bnd a.bout what 
exists and Rhat it is to exist. They are not primarily 
concerned with vTh8.t P8Xt of things exist. At the same 
time tile Ifletaphysician cen not and must not believe 
himself to be independent of scientific findings . In 
general metaphysioians must be able to modify their 
12. 
stand, not their aims, and according to science, must 
u tilize science, and g�neralize from scientific 
generalizations. It is the task of metaphysics to 
establish by induction from scientific propositions, 
propositions that do no t occur exolicitly in the 
sciences as a result of assumptions vdth built-in 
exclusi veness. 
After having referred to the relationship between 
metaphysics and science, it is essential to clearly 
di stinguish between the types of hypothesi s wi th lilLich 
they respectively deal. Sci en ti fie hypothesis can be 
varified because they state a relationship between 
variables. If the variables have been identified we 
may verify whether a predicted result actually takes 
place ( y :.(f) X t- K ). M:etaphysical hypotheses refer 
to constants; they refer to an existent condition of 
being. Therefore, p2_rticul2r posi ti ve instances are 
neither conclusive nor �o they posit definite 
verification. Yet the instances serve as i llustrations 
by clarifying through concrete examples and stimulating 
imaginative inSight ch makes us aware of contra-
dietory illustrations. Particulsr instances aid in 
sizing up an entire perceptual field. 
SincB ,the J11ethod::)logy of metaphYSiCS must be 
applied to unverific_ble statements, there is often the 
13. 
tendency to ,dlow II any thing to go" . Actually mete­
physicicms should try to const&n tly develop their 
methodology so as to state what would constitute 
approximate disverifications. In the final &nalysis 
they must exercise critical inquiry and honest in­
s ight. Though these two attitudes are the best method 
possi ble, they remain highly unreliable. The meta­
physician must sincerely attempt to survey experience 
from many various standpoints. 
At times there have been strong reactions to meta-, 
physics among theologians. The two main am ti-metaphysical 
theologians should be viewed in the light of their Kant�an 
influence. It W<JS Kant's epistEmologic8,1 dualism that 
lead to a metaphYBical agnosticisfJl. It is also the 
interweaving of Kantian dUB_lism and agnosticism that has 
infiltr8ted all German theology since Kant. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) in his discussion of religion 
substituted the " feeling of absolute dependence" for 
theology. The IIfather of modern theology" would not 
allow the intellectual or ethical aspect of consciousness 
to be stressed as being more supreme than the religious 
consciousness. Following along in the footsteps of his 
precu80r, Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) continues the 
reaction against metal')hysical theology by s2cying that 
we know God only on the basis of value- judgments. 
14. 
Religious judgments were valuational rath er than 
existential. Go� is not r eached by 8pecul �tion , nor 
by "evidenceslt in n ature , nor by any my stical experience s , 
nor by a r c.tion al ap riori or intimate feeling. They 
rejected metaphysics as the manner in which to stress 
ob jectivity. C I O ) 
But again we are drawn back t o  the fact that there 
still remains that perenni3_1 int e rest in the t ruth of the 
religious ideas in which the fai th is expressed. This 
i s  the very reason that Peul Tillich insists that 
theology and philosophy u ltimately are drawn to the 
same ontological question. We can not side-step the 
issue - man is confronted with being . To this truth he 
must respond . 
Philosophy is not the concern for mere m atte rs of 
fact; rather it is the "best wisdom of the lover of 
wisdom, with refer ence to ultim a te value and ultimate 
reali ty. II ( 11 ) Such a philosoph;Lc2,1-theJlogical 
approach underlines the fact that man with his total 
being responds to what he considers unconditionally 
important and his ultimate concern. He r e spond s to 
reality as a whole. 
Tillich continues in his "Introduction" to 
distingui sh between theology and philosophy, 
II Philosophy deals v,'i th the structure of being in 
itself; trleology deals wi th the rneaning of being for 
us.u ( 12 ) While being driven by a passion for object-
ive truth, the philosopher intends to pursue an 
investigation of being and its structures by means of 
a detached objectivity. In quite an opposite manner, 
the theologian involves himself with and commits him-
self to the existence which is his subject matter. Thus 
the first point of divergence is the cognitive attitude. 
secondly, there is divergence concerning the difference 
in their sources. liThe philosopher looks at the whole 
of reality to discover within it the structure of 
reality as a whole." He believes his cognative ability 
is such that he can understand the structures of being. 
He likewise assumes that the logo� of reality as a whole 
2Xld the logos working in him are identical. In other 
words, the logos permeates all or is common to all. No 
particular or BUGciel place reveals the structure of 
being. The COSiLOS is pure reason. ( 13 ) 
The theologian does not have as his source of 
xnowledge univers8_1 10ij'OS. The specific 10;208 that 
manifests itself in a p�rticular historical event, 
\ 
th2t became flesh, is the theologian's source of 
knowledge. The logos is not manifest through common 
rationality but through the church. The difference in 
content i8 shown when the philosopher deals with the 
categories of being in relation to the material which is 
8 truc tured by them E.nd when the theologian relates the 
same categories and concepts to t he quest for the "new 
being". He speaks of the self-estrangement of the 
subject, about the spiritual center of personal life, 
and about community as a possible embodiment of the 
"Nevv Being". (14) 
Having sufficiently examined the traditional 
function of ontology and having discussed the traditional 
ontological similarities and differences between the 
philosopher and theologian, it is important to view the 
previous considerations in the light of any beneficial 
contemporary trends. It is my conviction that con-
temporary philosophy might help us in focusing-in on 
the essence of this paper. 
Our primary concern shall be the investigation of 
8. general stE'ten;en t fl18..de by R. Gregor SId th in the 
General Introduction to the wonderful series of books 
published by The Library of Philosophy and Theology. 
The statement is as follows: 
"l\1iany things have contributed so to chsnge the 
picture of the \J70rk 1�vhich tileologi2J18 and philospphers 
have to do that it seems to be not so much a modified 
picture as an entirely new one. The strong blasts of 
posi ti ve and empirical clogn18tic theology blovving dovm 
17. 
f rom Swi tzerlcmd uIJon Europe and America , the imm ense 
changes which have overtaken philosophy, especially in 
Britain, so that the very ways of thinking seem to have 
al tered , cmd the ch?nges which have tak en pIece in the 
world in which we all live - have continued to bring 
about this revolution. We live in a post-liberal, post-
ideali st, ator:1ic age in theology. Philo sophy and theolog y 
a like are being compelled to face their traditional 
problems in such a radics.l way thC:1.t the questi on even 
( 1')) arises : are our traditional problems the real ones?" � 
Will�m F. Zuurdeeg has been as resDonsive to these 
new inf luences and has tried to incorporate the advantages 
of new movements and corresponding rev ol uti ons in his 
b ook, An Analytical Philosophy of Re�igl..Qll. It is 
Zuurdeeg I s firm conv i ction thclt a break vYi th the 
t raditional idealistiC approach to the fun c tion of 
philosophy is es senti al with the new insig hts brought 
about by the AnBlytic Age, According to him, the 
function of philosophy is to analyze languages. This 
function appears most r eali s tic because "it follows a 
method which compli.e s 'fii th vvhat we can observe about 
(16) :ge ople . It In our culture we are nwst aware thE�t men 
SCience, moral , poetry, and v a rious religious 
15.nguages. ) TileTefore we must not look upon philosophy 
1 fJ. 
�s a rational attempt to di scover the true meaning of 
life, the real v alue of thi ngs or the intrinsic nature 
of the uni ver'se. 
Tl.li s movement has been called by various terms 
Logical Positivi sm, Logical Empi rici sm, Logical 
Analysi s, and Analytical Phi�o80phy. While each term 
stands for a peculi ar emphssi s, this movement rebels 
agai nst the accusati on that it i s  a school. They 
consi der themselves "doing phi losophy." The ent i re 
group of men can be most eas ily referred to under the 
head ing, analyti cal philosophy� William Hordern of 
Garrett Theologi cal School in a recent lecture stressed 
the idea that very few pursui ts have COfne to such quick 
maturi ty. Taking a que from August Comte's proposal 
that positivism is a higher evolutionary plateau that 
goes beyond mythology and phi losophy, the phi losophi cal 
analysists have emphasi zed the i nnb i l i ty to make 
judgments, the abandonment of me tapflY si c s hrni ch r esul ts 
from language confusion) , and necessity of not making 
value-judgements. In essence, the task of the 
philosopher i s  to make himself unnecessary. This does 
not involve a the�ry but acti v i ty. Philosophy is therapy 
of l ang;u8.ge. This is the honest conclusion to 
question, "What is the purpose of phi losophy?" The 
throne of phi losophy has spl i ntered into many chairs 
19. 
of science. Tuese chairs of science hEve splintered 
into many specialized footstools. This historical 
revolution has caused contemporary philosophy (maybe 
a passing fad) to propose the preceding function. (17) 
Today the word IIsemantics" is being referred to by 
many people in many different fields. In most academic 
circles investigation of semantics has become a pre­
OCCUp8, tion. '1'he field of philosophy (specifi cally 
the logical positivist movement) has been its main 
entertainers. This trend is clearly reflected in 
such rema.rks 2S, nOur entire :?hilosophy is a correction 
of aur use of language.lI(l8) In a similar tone 
Bertrand Russell hE,S said thEt tae function of 
philosophy is not to edify mankind, but to clarify 
meanings. 
"The importance to the philosopher of the study of 
semantics may be realized when it is pointed out that 
there could be no philosophy without words, and that 
philosophy consist� of the meanings of words.n(19) 
William Hoerber continues with a word of warning. We 
muet proceed wi th discrin�inati ve caution as we approach 
various lingtIi.stic developments. Even t:ClOugh tb.ese 
people are preoccupied with meaningfulness, they t oo 
are sometimes vo.gue in their terminology. 'ire will 
encounter different uses of the words 'semantics', 
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'language'l and 'meaning'. If we are to really understand 
and think with these men, we must know what each is 
referring t o  when he speaks of' "verificati�n" et c etera. 
We m ust look for the assumptions and inevitable outcome 
of their proposals. ItThe apprehending and study of 
sema ntical distinctions, relations and principles is 
pr eparation of the ground upon which a scientific 
foundation of philosophy may be b uil t more easily, and 
more securely. It is a primary parL of a scientific 
method in Philoaophy.II(20) 
tiRe is a b oy; " a.nd lilt is raining outside;" and 
flNy disposition for doing what was right prevented me 
from robbing the bank", are all basic statements 
representing quite different typ es of grammatical 
struc tures. The first one is meaningful and is 
necessarily true by t:�;e established definit ion of its 
words. The second statement may be meaningful . 
Its meaningfulness depends upo n verification, which we 
find to be possible. The third statement leads us into 
som e difficulty. How are we to ver ify this feeling? 
If we cannot verify it, should we c ontinue discussing 
it? It is evident that we have come up against a 
a typical semantical problem. Can we retain this 
meaningless statement and use our language justly? 
rhis is the co ntex t of our topic. Those philosophers who 
deal exclusively wi th lingui stj_c problems 'feel I that 
a more detailed anal ysis of our l in@listic systems will 
lead to answers having factual validity and being able 
to be verified. Thereby, it is the greatest hope th&t 
the emotional pitfalls of the ordinary uncritioal use 
of l inguistics may be overoome. We cannot stand by and 
a l l ow languag e to lose its cogni ti ve cl aims. 
Rudol f CaTnap wrote a fine introduction to 
s emantics. His purpose in 1Hi ting' the book is, in 
addition to a ';)urely formal analysis of l anguage, 
that we are in dire need of "an a balysis of the signify-
ing f uncti on of l anguage, in other words, a theory of 
meaning and interpretation. "(21) Another very 
important consideration v!hich Carne_p is willing to 
express, cmd most others will not spell out in their 
writings, is that this devel opment of semantics lJlJil l  
ul tirL2tel y  construct a theory of truth and a theory of 
logical deduction. We must ah;ays keep in mind these 
p urposes and their far-reaching implications. 
Semiotic is the theory of signs and l anguage. 
This theory is divided into three areas, these areas 
stress 6.ifferent types of relationsni'Js. Pragm[,_tios 
(or interpretics) is the term referring: to the relation-
ship between words and user. Syntax is the re12tionship 
be -twee1l1 words and other words. semant iCB is the reI at ion-
-ship between the words and objects they designate. 
Semantics is our main field of in terest in this section. 
R. carnap also subdivides the Semantical division 
of Semio tics. Descriptive semantics is a title given to 
II t" "" . t· , l '  n th t· 1 f t -he aescrlp Ion ana ana YSIS 01 e seman lca ea ures, 
ei ther"of some pErticu.lar historically g iven language, . •  
or of all historically given languages in g eneral . ff ( 22) 
Then descriptive semantics is primarily the description 
of facts or is in g eneral an empirical sCi ence . A 
semantical system is the result of building a set of 
semantical rules. liThe construction and analysis of 
semantical systems is called pure semantics.If(23) Thus, 
i n cOntradistinction to the former , plJ.re semantics is 
analytical and does not pe rtain to factual content. 
In Chc:pter B, Carnap intr.oduces us to a fe"�r more 
e ssential terms. In the above discussion we recognized 
that a semantic a l system involves a designated set of 
rules. It is evident that by designating a certain set 
of rittles by which our 18Jlgu8ge must abide, we in-
augurate 8. semantical system that establishes a 
t ruth-condi tion fOl' every sentence employing descri::Jti ve 
senmnti.cs. Cc�rne.:p 83.yS tric,t the rules aTe a sufficient 
and necessary condition for the truth of an obj ect .  
I n  other words, a sys tem of language i s  rrlC"de understand-
a ble by the rules, because to understand the assertion 
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by the sentence is to know under what conditions it 
would be true. This is the neces sary ground work in 
understanding Borne of the main statements referred to 
by other books on the subject. Thus Oarnap h2,s adequate-
l y  expressed that rules determine the mea ning or sense 
of a sen tence. 
Another significant point made by Oarnap is that 
truth and falsity are deSignated by this term. The 
truth-condition previously discussed is a preliminary 
step toward the truth-value of a sentenc e . 
Oarnap sumB up hif3 br ief introduction by stating, 
tla semantical system may be constructed in this way: 
first a classification of th� s i g ns is given, then the 
rules of formation aTe laid down, then rules of 
designation, and finally rules of truth.,,(24) The 
logical outcome is a prescription for truth and such a 
prescription cul�inates in a "Oorrespondence" theory 
of truth. Thus we should re2.,li ze that a great deal 
is at stake. 
A few words in the way of summation are nrobably 
necessary at this point. B6rtrand Russell, when 
a.iscu8sing Ludwig Wittgenstein says that he views 
the rlevelopment of semantical systems rrruch ES we 
'would a chess g8Jf1.e. If we are to oley the game, 
there are certain rules which we must observe and 
only certain �ove8 that we are able to �ake. 
nWittengenstein ( Trac tatuB, 4.024, 4.46) has 
emphasized the point of view that the truth-conditions 
o f  a sentence constitute its meani n g , and that under­
standing consists in knowing these conditions.n(25) 
It would be almost impossible and a great short-
coming of this paper, not to sigh t some of the sources , 
schools, and men 11'1'110 ha ve made outstanding contributions 
to lin gui stic movement. Logical positivism has been the 
leading proponen t of many linguistic doctrines. In 
general, this movement is opposed to the religious 
philosophy of Protestant New�Orthodoxy. "Its aim is 
to get away from metaphysical value judgments and to 
purify knowledge from all axiological and religious 
elemert s.u ( 26 ) The sources of logic e l posl tivism are 
rooted deeply in philoso19hy and science. A study of 
British empiricism of the Eighteenth Century is a 
fine introduction to their beliefs. Following the 
positivistic influence of Comte they state that the 
sum total of knoi:vledge is provided by science. They 
inherited +he ""�1ni ri,-.i Qt' i r·lpp (LoO're v�.". v .. '(li�.i.,,- _ V _ U .. I.. .. ....... v.. J_:"" , Berkeley, 2nd 
t hat only assertions about empirioel faots a�Dit of 
verific8.tion. J'umping ahead in our ciisou8slon, but 
relevant to this point, is Humels belief that the 
impossibility of metaphysics is &le to the inability 
U"r" po) l.ll..t. . 1 ...... , 
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of verifying ita pr obl em s. 
The Vienna Circle founded by Morit z Schlick is 
probably the outstanding group in the historical 
of philosophy's preoccupation with linguistics. 
1-1ach preceded Schlick and made one outstanding con­
tribution t o the school. His procedure used in d efining 
terms employed in mechanics was that meaning is in the 
method. When the d omineering and ruthless Nazi regime 
came into being, the Vienna group broke up. Schlick, 
its founder , was stabbed by one of his students. Carnap 
went to the University of Chicago and continued teaching 
and wr iting. Waissmann w en t to teach at Oxford. Neurath, 
who �ied in England in 1945, was to becom e the first 
editor of the Monographs which were published just before the 
outbreak of the war and which later became the basis of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences. Later we 
see the entrance of the mathematicians, Whitehead and 
Russell, and the pragmatists, Peirce, James, and Dewey. 
This transplantation of logical empiricism was greatly 
s.ided by Alfred Jul es Ayer's book, Lane:uap;e, Truth 
and Logic I publ ish ed in 1936. (Reference to this book 
will be made later. ) 
It is interesting to note that R. Jarnap in his 
Introduction to Semantic�. states that the systematiC 
development of semantics stems from the Warsaw sch ool 
of 1 icians. This groupts contributions have been in 
the f iel ds of contemporary 10iosic and logical fo undations 
o f  mathematics. Kraft's book, The Vienna Circle, is the 
only other book that draws specific attention to this 
group. S. Lesniewski's lectures dealt with semantical 
concepts , e .g. concept of truth and the semantical 
antinomes. T. Kotarbinski made a o.ete.ile d  analysis of 
certain sementioal Bno. related pragmatical concepts. 
Alfred Tarski who was the main influence behind O arnapt s 
book laid the foundation of a systematic construction 
on the basis of the preceding analysis. Because the 
works of the Polish school were not translated until 
after 1936, they have not been given the credit they 
de serve . 
Another gre8.t influence upon the phil o sophy of 
analysiS in England has been the Cambridge Sohool. 
Ludwig Wi ttgensteil1 ( 1889-1951 ) is undoubtedly the 
paramount figure in this 8chool and possibly the 
entire historical develo·9ment of semantics. Dv.e to 
the exi stence of the Nazi regime, Ludwig went to 
C ambridge iNhere L1e 'I'Ve,S appoint ed professor in 1939 
as a result of G. E. Moore's retirement. The 
book Dublished durin� his life time. In 1958 his � �. 
I Prelimine.I'y StucUes for the IIphiloso':Jhic81 
Investigations" I, The.-E;Lue and Brown Books VIas 
published. Ludwig dicta.ted. the " Blue Bookll to his class 
Cit Cambridge during the 1933r-34 term and had a few 
copies stenciled, The "Brown Book" was presented in 
the same manner during 1934-35 at which time he had 
only two students, That year he had only three copies 
made, These two o ne-year lecture notes were circulated 
bound in a blue wrapper and brown wrapper respectively, 
and tilereby they 2cquired their names, 
In the early portions of the "Blue Book" 
Wittgenstein believes that the puzzles we try to solve 
arise from 2n 2.tti tude to·ward language. tf The man I'tho 
is philosophically puzzled sees 2. law in the lNay a 
word is used, and, trying to apply this law consis 
ently comes up against . p2radoxica1 results.tf ( 27 ) 
Before this discussion he does not see mataphysics 
connected with lan§,'U,Bge, but rather an attempt to Esk 
and e.nS1<ver questi ons in a sci en tific mBnner. 
In his first public2tion ( Tractatus ) he developed 
the view that all truths of 107ic are tautologies . 
. 
Tautologies are simply analytic?l statements. Their 
contr2dlctory is a self-contradiction. They are 
necessarily true. In the following years, his interest 
changed from logiC to logical analysis. 
Earlier we referred to Ludwig when speaking of 
his oonoept of' "l E'.nguage games" wi th their rules an d 
restrictions. Later he rejeo t ed what had b een said 
in his first book ooncerning statements being divided 
i n to ultimate oonstituents - logical atomism. One of 
his major statement s  was that the meanin g of a word 
is aoquired through and in its use. Aocording to him) 
we m ust learn the 'grammar' or Ilogiot of a word. "The 
rai sing of metaphy si cal ,problems would then be the 
resul t of e, defec tive grasp of the grammar of words . 
For onoe t he rul es are proper ly under s tood, there 
survives no temp t at i on to ask such question s. 
Linguistio t herapy has oured us from the desire.u(28) 
Wi th an understanding of the problems , the basio 
t erms , main SGuroes of influen oe , an d prominent pro-
ponents, we are required to oenter our a t tention on the 
preoooupation wi th meaning� It is quite ev ident th at 
ell l in guis t i c developments should be investigated 
with the reoognition that it did not come about in a 
v acuurn, and a con 80i ous effort should be nlade t o  
reoogni2,e the in fluences of the logica l , mathems,tical, 
and sci entifi c developments of the nineteenth and 
twentieth oonturies. 
In any semEmtic21 anal y si :o it is necessary to p1'e-
suppose the stipulated rel e tion betl-yeen the stg'n 8,nd 
the Signified. Specific meaning IS given to a sign 
("-,(j (.:}u _ 
when we preci.sel y  design2te v;rH3-t the aoove rel ation 
is to be. If any sti pul ation is to �e �ade, both 
the sign and the signified n1llst be idel1t'ifiam3;;�. If 
we use the word "tree" we must be able to indicate 
what the word is and indicate what the si�nified 
object (tree) i s. This process is usual ly carried on 
by definition, but definitions donlt proceed on ad 
i nf�ni tum. We, sooner or lEter, arrive at prinlitive 
co ncepts (undefi nable words) where we simply point 
to the immediately present. 
We thus see the ne.£ess i tY.of verificati on i f  only 
by painting. This brings us to the belief that the 
meaning of the s i gn is in i t s  veri cation. For the 
statement "It is raining outside." to he_ve any mec.n-
i ng we wil l in the process of analysis discover the 
means of verification. Alfred Jules Ayer, in his book 
1anguage�uth 2 and 102:ic does not think a relevant 
experience is sufficient for verification and neither 
are observational statements. He carries the necessity 
of verification to the extreme of requ"�ring an ex-
peri!Dental statement. He is vJil l i ng to say tnet s tate-
ments according to some semantical systems are meaning-
ful which ere neither analytic nor e�piricall y  verifiable. 
For him the only real meaning and meaningful statement 
i n  the sense of true or felse is the l i  teral me8nA!.?.B: 8.S 
distinguished from the factual meaning or empirical 
hypothesis. Unless a statement meets this meaning 
of the 'verification of meaning', it woul d not be 
capable of being understood in a scientific hypothesis 
o r  common-sense statements. 
Kraft, as he views the semantical developments 
of the Vienna school, doesn't believe their idea of 
verific;.;,tion necesei tates actua1:. verification. They 
are speaking more of a 'verification in 1)rinci}J.l�l. 
This possibility of verification can be either by 
logicB.I ( Ayer's above method ) or empirical verific2tion. 
�eaningless statements are empty in regards to being 
scientifically verifiable, but are in no way non-
sensical. Even though such statements are not non-
sensical, he discusses them very little. Our only 
conclusion i s  that they are of littJ.e significance. 
He points out that we must be careful if we say 
that only assertions about empirical facts admit of 
verification .. In essence, only s tatements we prove 
through experience are meaningful because they alone, 
can be verified. Therefore, mathematical a nd l ogical 
statements are meaningless, even if they are state-
mente c oncerning the logic of science. 
In sUl'nmarizing the verific2tional an21ysis, 
" 
Fredrick F�rre s ays that we should set rules for 
l a nguage if I've are to use it as Em instrument for a 
communication of fact. But ne says, and we should 
temember, th2t we will get out of a l a n gua ge what we 
put into . ... 1 G. Within the dichotomy of analy tic state-
wen ts of t ruth-concU ti ons ( no exper'i ence necessary ) 
and fact-asserting synthetic statements ( which are 
n ot mecmingful oecause they Cere extra linguistic and 
must be tested a�ain st some form of relevan t truth 
e.g. sense experience ) , all logically im por tant 
m eaningfulness is included. 
For a fuller understanding of the t opiC let us 
further investigate the meaning of 2 l'elevant truth. 
Our sense-experience verification is not conclusive. 
The corollary to this stat em e n t is that ver ificati on 
is greater or lesser probable b ut not necessary. It 
stands to reason that if we C2n through verification 
prove the positive 6enial of the negative we also have 
a meaningful statement. Thus verifioation can also be 
arrived at by falsifiability.(29) 
If �e attempt to verify anything beyond analytic 
or sy n t he ti o statements, �e are once 8�ain in danger. 
At this level t ruth-condi tions 2�re not 111et 2nd any 
s tatements are dev oid of literal significance. If 
they are stated, they are parasitical be c au �e they 
fail to abide by the rules. These statements operate 
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o n  ccn "BiIlOti ve capi tall! because they do not allow for 
translat ion in to statement s  abou t pos sible experie nce. 
Fer:c� pre se n t s  an excellen' t swmnary in three 
basic statements. 8 ) Philosophy is not empirically 
uninformative. "{vi t tgens tei n says, flPhilosophy is not 
8 nE'tural science. II The s phere for philosophy is 
Ulogical meaningfulness." He became convinced t ha t  
philosophy should rid i t self of a priori no tions re-
garding an ideal languEge and of the rela t ion of 
language to fcw t and concern i tself only with lcmgus.ge 
as such, wi thin its actual use. b. ) Lingui stic 
significance is the primary subject mat ter of 
philosophy, Analysis is e s sent ial bec[�use gra'1lmat ic-
ally p erfect e en t e noe s may conceal 102::i.c81 unmeEl.Ding . 
c.) The function of philosophy is t o  engage in ahaly s i s 
of Lieaningful l anguage . 
Acoo:cding to Ayer, all ph�losophers that have been 
considered to be great have si�ply been misunders t ood 
analysis t s. For example, Soora t es was mos t  intere s t ed 
in establishing the me aning (e.i. identifying specific-
'""lJ , - ,",l, 'c .... we '"·"Ieal'"') of t eY'""I1S 0. �.Y \ .Llc:..v \N .,. J.L � ,.J. .,. � - . In the Republi.9" 
Socrates wants man to ask himself what he really means 
by the �or� fljustice.u Do we re ally know the meaning 
of tern-:s? If 1.':e don't s tipul?te Cc meaning of ','lhat 
v2"lue a.retn.ey�'? There are no per � philosophical 
problems. Philosophy is a method of making statements 
clear, it is involved with solving puzzles, not reveal­
ing truth. ( 30 ) 
It is important t ho.t we recognize the ramific8,tions 
of such proposals and the blow that is [;;'i ven to meta-
physics. The mOVEmen t of logical positivism seems to be 
one more of the mBny movements which o.eveloped within 
the realm of philosophy; and "'hen thi s off-shoot became 
inde�pendent, it took away a portion of its {nother. The 
question remE,ins, IIW'ill the mother which has given 
birth to many offspring be resolved through the in­
dependent division of her branches?" 
iT{i ttgenstein has s8.id that metE,p;1ysics so long as 
they exist have a defective grasp of the 'grammar' of 
vwI'ds. AyeI' say 8 tile t lYlete.pny 8i C8 cannot reveal to us 
knowledge of a transcendent reality. We can only verify 
that w:lich tile senses can experience 2,nd not the super-
expel'i ence. 
M. Schlick wI'6te an essay entitled IITurning Point 
in Philosophyl . ( Die Vvendi Der Phil080phietf opened the 
first nU.mber of Volurne I of Erkenntni ss ( 1930-31) . ) In 
his ,mtt-li,etE�physical essay , principle assumptions cHe 
set forth. "The clue to their nature ts to be found 
in the fact that every cognition is an expression or 
representation. That is, it expresses a fact which is 
cognized in it." "80 all tmowled�e is SUCll only by 
virtue of its form. It is through its form ths.t it 
represents the f act known." The signs not becoming 
t he determiner of reality and any ideas concerning 
epistemology are thrown to the wind. "The form it­
self cannot be represented.,,(3l) "Everything is 
knowable which can be expressed . There are 
consequently no questions whioh are in principle 
i nsoluble." Meaningless sequence of words are such 
beoause u the�!! II tra.nsgress the profound inner rule811 of 
logical syntax discovered by nev� analysis," (32) ( T he 
inner quotes are roy orm. It seems this is purely 
emotional language.) 
8C11liok 001". tinue8 by seyin2; there 02.n be no meta-
phystcs "not beca.use 1Ne aren't capable of the te,sk but 
because there is no task. Then it will no longer be 
n ecessary to speak of "philosophical problems" for one 
vvill speak philosoDhically concerning 8.11 ·�)roblems . •  "(33) 
Ferr� has a very interesting chapter dealing with 
the elimination of theological metaphysios. The almost 
impossible problem to be solved is for the theological 
lang uage to llli:intain a fFotual oontent And at the same 
t ime have a supernatural reference. ThE r adical division 
in language between the observable and unobservable is ) 
not permissable. 
To say th�t God is necessary is to say something 
logically impossible; a synthetical term such as God 
united with an analytical term is logically incompat­
ab le. It is similar to speaking of a round square or 
a beginning not preceded. by sOElething. This theologic­
al misuse of language is emotive. Since these state­
ments are unfalsibiable, they are nonsense. ( Recall 
that a previous man said that a meaningless statement is 
not non-sensic8l. And according to vvhat Schlick 88.id 
above, this idea is nonsense 8.no. thus doesn't exis:t � )  
A revelant parable told originally by Professor 
John Wisdom explains how two men came to a group of 
flowers in the jungle. One man said there Vi;8..S a 
gsrdener, and the other disagreed. After no gardener 
showed up in a few days, and they had built an elect ric 
fence around the area and no s creams V'rere heard, and no 
blood hounds tracked anyone down , the original believer 
said the gardener was inviSible. The other friend 
replied asking how the eLusive gardener differs from 
an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all. ( 34 ) 
I n  passing it is worth noting that viie s1:\ould not 
,.;:ive up the le.ng'uage but ElU8t work for a restatement 
which i5 essential. An example of his restatement i2 
that i.nstead of saying trGod exists", we should say 
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"some people have had and 811 m2y hc-:ve experiences 
called 'meeting GOdlll.(35) 
There are four main ideas that we may obtain from 
R. Oarnap's essay liThe Elimincttion of Metaphysics • . • •  II 
Any psychological association of some image or feeling 
with a word is not a suffici ent or valid way of acquir-
lng meaning. There is no critera for an application 
and nothing is asserted. Simply putting these emotional 
'INO rds in new context does not help in becoming meaning-
ful. Secondly, Oarnap believes the mythological use of 
1 God' i s  meaningful but the metaphysical use is meaning-
less because it transcends exp er ience . The theological 
use of the word oscillates between the former two and 
its di sadvEm tage is tha tit is judged by the enrplr1 cal 
sci ence. Tllridly, under trle topic the HL�eentngles8ness 
of All hletaphysicsll, he deals with the faults centering 
ETound the verb lito be. It The first fault is the 
alcbigui ty b et1,'�;een its use as a copula prefixed to a 
predicate and its use as designating existence. The 
second faul t lies in the mea.ning of its use as 
II existence". ( ��6) Since Kant we have l:novm that 
Hexiste!1ce" is not a property (Goo. is). It can only 
ergo surnli.) First, lve cannot say that " I  exist". An 
existential statement d08S not heve the form " a 
exists" but rather "there exists a.1t The second fe.ult 
i s  the t ransttion fro m  "I think" to "I e xist " . Not 
"I am Ell to "I am" bu t rather "I am Btl to liB exists". 
(G •• E. :01oore is s upposed to have wri tten an influential 
essay dealing witD. the fa ults of the verb lito be".) 
Up to this time there have only bee n slight 
indications of personal disagreement or rather obvious 
inadequ�cies of certain ideas. At presen t we must 
appraise and evaluate some essential doc trines. 
Almost all men th a,t have b een ment ioned as proponets 
of lithe method of verification provides the meaningll 
( the most general wc"y of e xpres sing the over-all trend) 
say that the fun ction of philosophy is not the represent­
a tio n of facts. As Carnap says, metaphysical speculation 
merely expresses a voli tion al atti tude t01J\ard life.. He 
beli eve s the context of metaphysical speculation is not 
theoretical and therefore does n ot describe the state 
of affai l'S. 
Personally, this seems to be one of the major 
shortcomings. An a ttitude , which I beli eve metaphysics 
to be, may 1[;ell be non-theoretical in ti1e sense that 
this language cioes not refer to plain, un8o.ul terated 
ob.j ecti ve facts. BUT 'I?e cannot go 8. step further 
( 1'hich th(�ir c;o.sumption seems to do) 2nd deny thst 
these life-feeli�gs don' t in di cate and point to a 
reality as factual ( possible a better term would be 
IIquasi-fa.ctualll ) as 8.ny other and 8Tentt fYleaningful 
to our existence. A trealityl as prescribed by their 
assumptions defin itely short changes reeclity. They 
only deal with a segment of reality which they " feel" 
confident to handle. According to Ferr� , any victory 
tha t narrows down I'ihat is fact is too cheap to be c on-
vincing. Susanne K. Langer would also agree that they 
have arbitrarily c reated their own "little grammar 
bound island. II 
When anyone sets up arbitrary rules by which we 
arrive at meaning, they are setting up a priori con-
ditions for truth and exclude a ny thi ng else. They seem 
to be saying if you cannot :012Y our rules then you ccm-
not play. This is an escape from SODe real i s su es and 
a denial of what could possibly be reality. The move-
ment starts out in an attemnt to c larify langu age and 
c.liscc;rd unveri fiable l8n:::;uage games Emd ·winds up creet-
ing their own isolated game in a vacuum. Man determines 
the meaning of sign-combinations. Meaning becomes 
releti ve to a certcun lc:m2:u9.ge conr)osed of a sem2ntlc2.1 
system. Wittgenstein h imself recognized Borne of these 
things when he said "My st2telflents 8.re meanin:zless" 
and not ng is easier than to expose and question as a 
meaningless pseudo-problem. (37) 
The verification principle is misunderstood if 
it is used as a c riterion for judging the meaningfulness 
of all lang uage. The principle itself should be assert­
ing a fact, but when the principle is used to test it­
self we find it devoi d of meaning because there is no 
sense experience for the task. For on their very 
premi ses the statements wust be judged meaningless. 
Ferre also sho1;11s its narrowness in deali ng with 
t heological langu2.ge and paradoxes whtch may both be 
"philosophically useful or cognitively illuminat i ng ." 
I n  essence it becomes a criterion of empiricality, not 
o f  meaningfulnes s. (38) 
In summation, the using of the verification 
principle has possibly saved m etaphysi cs and theological 
iscourse from becoming non-cognitive through lack of 
a technical use of language. 'It is prim2rily valuable 
as an antidote, but poisonous as an exclusive diet. t 
As a principle it s urely fails to epnreciate the wide 
variety of linguistic uses. Car ried to it s l ogical 
ext reme it distorts 01.1.r use of language r8.ther than 
clarifies. Afte r thinking t hro ugh this section we 
should I'ealize thst theTe is a neceesi ty for ;l1eta-
physics and an urgent need to be concerned with 
semantics. Language is the only means of comnmnicc:.ting 
f Ewtual experi ences. We canno t ab8�don 18.ngu2ge 0'''  
( 
g et away with misusing it. It is necessary for living 
a full life .  We must make a co n scious effort to do 
, 
language justice. An investi�ation of meaningfulness 
must always be at the fore�front of philosophical 
i nvestigation s. 
Thus fEr we hE.ve tried to explain the ontolo�:ical 
qu.estion as present ed by tr 2,cli tional philosophy and 
have sought an understanding of the contemporary fad in 
philosophy to analyze the la.nguage which a tt empts to 
communicate this reality� In the f inal section we will 
b e  pr i m arily concerned �ith a functional analysis of 
religious la nguag e . Tti s spproach seems to be only 
natur al after r e 2.lizing the buil t-in shortcomin?:s ln 
the premises of the earlier analytical philosophers and 
the insight into our problem given through Wittgenstein's 
nroposal that the only remein i�� approach is to conce rn 
ourselves v.ith the actu.al use of 12ng;uB,;;e, �l()t a.n i(:eal 
lan�uag e and its relation to fact. 
Probably the best transition;l idea is that eST)vtlsed 
by V'till em Zmude as he draws attention to the �ifferen-
tiating fact or s between mere �ropo 8ition a l statements and 
statements mcde �by [1. To ask the n�ec;ni of 
oposition:::: is only relevcmt to n12.theL12.tics end science. 
To ask the meaning of what a person states is relpv2nt 
the l anguage situation involve s a hurnsn si tua ti on . As 
Z uu rdeeg continues in his book, this emphasis exposes 
us to the man-who-speaks. lVIcm speaks wi th convictions. 
In f act , man is his convictions. Emphasizing his idea 
wi th [{lOre vehemence , Zuurdeeg c211 s the language of 
mathematics and sc ience "artificial" langu age . I take 
this to mean, it is artificial because it does not take 
man into consideration. We c an not perform a logical 
Etnalysi S of 2.. person. Simultaneously and interwoven 
vvi til the l E ngu ag e si tu e..ti on is B. hums.n si tuation. A 
def1ni te shor tcoming of E�ny 2xl alysis is the omission 
of this sign ificant fact. 
Often in the ]:"listorical development of philosophy 
E�nd theology we encmulter & tt ernpts to explB.in the 
epistemological basis of faith. B ut it seems evident 
that such ideas con o erning the dynamics of faith are 
only convinc ing for those who al re8.dy have made 
tl-leistic commitments. An eX8mple of this vTOuld be the 
�oluntaristl8 beli ef that faith c reates the fact. 
According to voluntarist, man cannot wait for a proof 
concerning his faith. It is similEr to an understanding 
that a girl's love depends u�on the boy's love that is 
offered simult8neously. Another mE.liner in 
idea may be expressed is that we cannot w8it to plant a 
seed until �6 have proof that a plant will grow from 
tae seed. It appears as thoug h  the rel ationship between 
the seed and the flower is conscientiously knovm , even 
if t hi s knowledge is the resnl t of accidental findings, 
before a p e rson ultimately commits himself to the act of 
plEmting. It is as if theism were already true. Like-
wise any attemot to base faith on the moral order of the 
universe (e.g. Butler ' s Conscience, Kant's Moral Law, or 
Ro ss' Duty ) seems to be convincing only for those who 
already profess theist ic inclinations. Again t her e 
seems to be no logical inference from the illative 
sense (i.e. "to divine the sign ific ance of a large field 
of evidence", or "appreciating the drift of miscellaneous 
mass of eVidence")(40) to the knowledge thEt God exists. 
These attitudes seem to be the result and not the cause. 
John Hi ck's development 01' the nEture of faith 
provides certain insights for our present point of con-
cern. His basic thesis deals with the manner of 
Co i tion by whi cll the re112':iou8 man ge.ins an awareness 
of God. Another of his mein endeavors is to see how 
religious cogni ti011 is relrted t o  other cogn itions . In 
the incention he stetes that there i2 an epistamol 09ical 
pattern ec,ployed. for 2_11 l::novvtng. He stresses the fact 
t t the theistic belief �ill be peculiar, but this is 
o nly n atural when we consider that through it 
co�nization of a unioue object is �nown. The word 
II signii'i.cc'nce" instead of "form" 01' "me8nin�;11 is the 
key word. The latter words have been used in so meny 
VB.I'ious philosophies th2t too much time vW1J.ld be r e-
quired to cl�rify their meaning and draw ou� the 
distinctions necessary for the continuation of the 
presentation. 
The bs. si c ch2racteri sti c of hmna.n experi ence is 
the takin.2 on of I1siF-,"nificc:nce". I t  is this fundament al 
and all persuasive characteris tic th2t permits the 
conscious experiencing of outer reality; the possessi on 
of signific2nce is th a t which enables us to inhabit and 
come to terms with our environment. 
Significance makes an essential reference to action. 
IIOonscio1J.sness of c. p:'rticular '::cino of enviroD::1EntB.l 
I 
significance involves a j udgment, iMplicit or explicit, 
28 to the aDpropriateness of a pprticular kind, or range 
o f  kinds, of 3.ction in relati on to that envi ronme nt . 11(41) 
To refer to anythi as having ob j ective significance is 
to reveal i ts re12.tioncl aspect since th e phy e ica1 
structure functions in reletion to humeD interests. In 
2. K 2ntian i'2shion, John Hick S2.YS thEt the corre18tive 
ment8l c.cti v i  ty "r.::jY i>l1ich the vc"rious signifi c?Dces Ere 
2pprehended involves our interpretation. In addition 
this interpretative action takes place in relation to 
types of existence or orders of significFnce, those 
44 . .  
being na hual, human End divine. After :.1Eving iuention-
ed objective-s nificance Hick s�ys thEt it is character-
istic for man to live also in a dimension of personality 
. . b' 1 . t T' " . .  ·f" . 1 e.no. r'esponSl 1 1 y. DIS nWl1(3.n s lgnI .... lcance neceSS8.rl y 
follows the realization of the objective significance. 
To establish the significance of one, it is necessary to 
recognize and deal with the other; the moral only follows 
after recognizing the natural significance . 
"Eas tili 8 epi stemologi c E, 1 pa radigm - of one order of 
significance super-imposed upon and mediated through an-
other - 2ny further im�licBtione? . . As ethi cal 
significance interpenetrates n�tural significance, so 
religious signific2nce interpenetrates both ethical and 
nEtural. �he divine i6 the highest and ultimate order 
of significance, mediating neither of the others and yet 
being medi<cted throuiSh both of tb.em.u(42) 
This "iDterDretatlve leaD" comes onlv sfter one _'. -.l, 0-' 
focuses upon experience as a whole. It involves a 
recognition of situational-significance. It is not a 
reasoned conclusion or an unreasoned hunch. "It i s, 
p11tatively, an apprehension of the divine pres e n c e 
inference to a generel truth, but a "divine-hul11c.n 
e ncounter", a medi2ted meeting with the livi ng God.,,(43) 
While this is essentially an epistemological paradigm, 
it carr ies over or is incorporated in and through a 
way of living. This is the essence of a total being 
invol ved id th to tal existence. And af ter having come 
to live in terms of this interpretation, we neither 
require nor c�n we possibly conceive of a validation 
process for thif cognitive claim. (A d i s cussion of the 
inability to test these claims, the possi bility of 
their mere psychological existence as opposed to 
existential existence will be covered later. ) 
Another unique point is brought to our attention 
by Hick : 
Fox ci 
"There jR in cogni ti on of every kind an unresolved 
mystery. The kno wer- known relationship is in 
the last a.mlysis suj. s(enel'ig: the E;tery of 
cogni tion persists e.t the end. of every tnquiry -
though the p e r si stence dOES not urevent UB 
from 
LiOn] 811 t 
cor'nlO ZlO Y'':;' (44) --' b ! J·J.o· 
let us continue eli scussi the element of 
mystel'Y and view its Tole in contempOl'21'Y science 2nd 
)llilOE ophy. Certain supposi t io ns of the contempor8.ry 
trends in science ana los ophy aTf: that Vie mus t 
6emand clarity in our thinki and thft all thinking 
is problem s olvin g . Accordingly mystery originates 
from a lack of �nowledgE which science will attempt to 
overcoffie and secondly from unclear thin�i yhich 
philosophy will eliminate. Contemrorary di scipline s 
have as their COll1Y!1 on go 81 t he eli1111 nc t 1 on of 
mystery. (
45
) 
Professor H e ss e rt pOints out that a r iddle 
consti tutes a pseudo-problem or involves a confu.sion 
of terms. A puzzle contains the elements for e. solution 
and merely reqUires being put In the correct order. A 
problem is a situation to which the answer is not given; 
but with proper plans being 8stRblished, we may arrive 
at an answer. He emphasizes that a myst e ry is still 
distinct from the three pr e ceding situ ations. A my s tery 
is unique in that the more you go into it, the more 
mystery is encou�tered. Also the more mystery we 
experience the greater respect we h�v e for its pro-
fundity. In addition, the mystery sheds light on 
other situations, rather thrYl itself. ( 46 ) 
The sin guo non of [;ys tery is the c:t ti tude of 
wonder. For the Greeks who looked at nature as an 
eternal principle underlying the sensible world and 
at sci e n ce as an intellectual contemplation of the 
divine object, mystery ViaS never cispelled but Elr':8Ys 
laors fully revealed. In modern SCience, wonder is trsnB-
ferred to WEn, End he compels n�ture to answer his 
(�u e stions. Al so mati:lerncctic8.l l2.ngus.ge C:iDd icnowle dge 
contain no degrees of depth or profundity for modern 
8cience, If we accept Eucledian ;eometry as our 
geometr ical yardstick and all explanation within the 
scheme, all more complex or wider app licati on follow 
necessarily. Diemetrically opposed to modern science is 
the c oncept of revealed truth 11Ihich offers mul tiple 
levels of depth. The former involves systems of l{now­
ledge. that are eternal truths, as opposed to the claims 
of revealed truth that �re eternally true. The basic 
attitudes have c hanged from contemulation of the self­
revea.ling of nature to humen f11e.stery through experiment-
ation. 
The mystery referred to by the Holy Bible was not 
ti.le different elements of illcm IJUt the difference in man 
2.S a 1F.:hole and God, not V�h2t i 8 r2tional and empirica,l 
but what is within man's power and at CEn be revealed 
o nly by God. Mystery is therefore an in tegral part of 
religion and rellglous language, It is very poss ible 
that contemporary emph2.ess haVE made us blind to an 
integral p�rt of what we are attempting to investigate. 
We need to seriously consider the fact that mFvbe we 
'"' 
- .  
- "" 
have lOst a p,rspective of existence. that is most basic 
t o  our co;�ni tion of the reed de:)th di:nension of reall ty-� 
the reality thpt prese�ts us as a total being who needs 
to be orientcted to the objective COSiliOS, Unc,oubtedly 
such a perspective gives us a keener ineight into the 
transcende ntal reality referred to by religious 
le.nguage. 
I 
Frederick Ferre in Lan&uage, Logic and Go� presents 
a brief analy sis of the v2.rious functional uses of, 
religious language. His supposition is t hat a functional 
analysi s is directed toward understanding the genuine use 
of religious language instead of being directed specif-
ically at the manner in whic h it is m isused � In the 
chapter entitled "Familiar Functions of Theological 
Discourse", a discussion is presented that deals with 
four d.ifferent fun ction s  of theolo�:ic21 lan2u2<9::es. 
1.,..... '�_' '..... � 
According to Ferr� the exi stenti 81 12nfl:uege functions as � - � 
a means of recogr:i zing the) tall y;;en have certain fea tur es 
in common. To merely drop the "existential situation" 
reieI'red to with this simDle ststement 8Dd then state 
tha.t the "central factor" of thie situEtion is the fact 
the.t every indivlduc:.l is "one-who-must-die" is certainly 
s eems to r efer to understEr:cii b thEt 8re qui te com�on; 
but its si§:'nific8nt functi o n , e. S a que�t:, nota.n a.1l1swer, 
seems t o be the perscr:81 experience th2t is encountered 
in the ,deist of the quest." It is tile possibility of 
suthenticity origin f t i n z  from the existentipl tension. 
This reality is the significent reference; 2nd it is 
through the experience of this existential situation 
tlL;t man encount ers a serious ann nonest quest for the 
me aning of his existence. It is not the mare objective 
fect thc=:,t I must die, but rather the ne'w dimension of 
personal life that unfolds for the first time through 
s uch an experience. Ferr�'s additional reference t o  
claims concerning "Bfte;r life" seems t o  reveal sti 11 
further his lack of understanding concerning this 
function of theologic[d 12nguage. In' his summery he is 
c orrect in saying tlEt this language does not need to be 
theistic. But it seems that this l�ngu2ge evolves from 
8 more preliminary situation that can lead to a more 
thorough un�erst2ndi ng of the funct ion of religious 
le.ngu2ge. This is its main attribute, co.nd this is what 
F l . - ., t . erre IS unaD�e 0 reCOgnIze. 
A second f liar function of theological discourse 
concerns ethical commitment. Professor Braithwarte 
believes the essential funct ion is the stat ement of moral 
assertions. Biblical stories are the best example of 
e thical assertions. These stories are rooted in an 
agapeistic conCErn for the individupl's relationshiu to 
the 'V';orld ,md ot.::::o;r inc.iviclucls. Camilli tment to the 
peistic interpretBtion requires puttin g the essential 
, 
meaning conveyed thro ugh these stories into �ction and 
secondly responding with one' s emotions, feeling, et ceter? 
A. C. Ewing emphasizes th�t for emotions to re8�ond 
over a long period of time r eoui re s  an ob j ective re�lity. 
As pointed out before in discussing the essenti?l role 
of iy:ystery, Ewing does not view commi tment to ethical 
standards as an intellectual conver sion . Instead, 
ethics involves commitment of the whole being to an 
ob jective r e ality , Hare attempts to show thEt the 
unioue function of theolo �" ic81 lenguc:.ges is founded in 
so�ething more basic. The ethic?l function to which 
Ewing r e fers rises out of something more basic. The 
unique expression from which, behavior arises is a 
"belief-content". Ag;:in, the",e eXDI:.:nations as to the 
function of theological statements are signigicant, but 
their supe.rficiali ty does not bring us closer to any 
concrete re�lity. They aren't one 
sost revealing functions. 
the 
H. IV:. Here 8e.yS thE>.t religious statements l"ea.lly 
func ti on 28 a means of ex=)ressing quesi-f2ctual beliefs. 
The vl,oro "quasi" (k�i'S\) used in this context means lias 
if, in a As 
2� exa�ple of that to which he is referring, Hare sights 
the conversion of Paul �hile on the road to Damascus. 
P811 61d not decide to stop persecuting the Jews simply 
bec2use he tbought he ought not CLot in t hi s mf'nner. 
Pc'.ul's beh2vior chang eci a s  result of understandi & 
matter of fact during 11is encounter +, un Jesu s the . 
Christ. Hi s behavior was a natural by- oduct that 
spr oute d fro� an e xp e rienti al encounter with quasi-
fact. Hare l s discussion of function seems to be more 
informa tive because he str'8sses the fact th2t thie type 
of langu8f;e refers to a unique and distinctive reality, 
WL12.t we believe is prim2.ry to our outlook 111Jon life., 
R. M. Hare makes a corollary statement dealing with the 
releVance of attitude. He believes that attitudee 
sha.pe our interpretati on of facts, Attitudes may be in 
dis&.greement, but fe.cts may not. It seems evi dent that 
life is org2.nized sround atti tudes 8.nd that II ordinsryll 
facts are tte result of acti ve discrimination on our 
pert. "F2ith (oe8 not su.pply vrhet is missing in 
knowled&e. It helps us to obtain knowledge, not as a 
method, but as an Ettitude in vhioh learnin? is m?de 
.'PORS·l'hle .,,(47) 'i'll' " q' -t t' i' � +' f..T ..... , _ _ �i ,:0 '!.l(J 2 ,lon rom .t-r oJ. e s sor •• esserl.> S 
book states explicitly the vital necessity and role 
played by attitude. But the necessary Doint to gr0SD �J .1" "...) �-. .t 
is thEt attitude and method are not synonymous in this 
cc,--se. - t ' ..... ." . t t· .L t t' ... � 1;1 l;lJ.o.e lS flO � l1l3}7 GO rD. n but is re th er 
an Tstanding that is the context in which we learn. 
but the question arises YJheth.er a.ttl tude is 
necessarily logically prior to any facts. If this were 
so, as Hare state s , man's outlook would never chs e. 
It seems thct the �ttitude would be i n n a te or acquired 
possibly through teaching or at least before any facts. 
affected the attitude. The facts must grasp you, not you 
grasp them. Hare views the attitude a s  making the fa cts 
and t ranscending the facts. Hesse r t  is pointi ng out thet 
the attitude is not the method. Hare puts faith in 
Kanti 2.n terms v,'hen he says thB.t it is an 111 timate 
category of thought and what w� reco�ni ze 2S fact is 
relative to the ultimate category. Ultimate categories 
imply method of knowing fact, fact rela tive to category, 
This way no feet can be disproven. But 8.S Hessert noints 
out, fact is conn e cted with !:nowledge and knowledge c an 
expose false faith. Therefore, Hare h2s recognized the 
necessi ty of atti tude but 118.8 incorrectly 8.'?soctated it 
vvi th the !��ethoc; of acqui rin g  fe:.ct. Agcin the functionsl 
analysi S has broug�1t to our attention some snortcomtngs 
of dt f f er en t views, but also it has exposed new in sights. 
John Wisdom, who was referred to in section two of 
this peper, sees the fun o tion of theolo�ic21 lan�uaqe . � �� G 
ss s o;;;ethi.n� (LOre than atti tud.in8.1. As was pOinted out 
before, the exi8te�ce of the g�rdener in his illustrat-
ion, 00:J.1(. not be verified. A: t:�lOugh we CEmnot verify 
our be llefs, a,s 2.180 the two n:en ire the i11u.strcction 
could not, Vie cc:cn continue our discussion by Ii direcU.Ylg 
our attention" to the petterns i?: the "i'8Ct·S". POillting 
up f e atures in the facts is the met hod by which the men 
continued their talk. Therefore, Wisdom believes 
theological language functiorn only as an attention-
directing device. While this undoubtedly may be a 
function of theological language, this cannot be the 
most unioue function . It seems very inadequate in the 
light of the enormous cognitive claim that is at stake. 
It does not do j ustice to the claim being made, While 
this function may hove real purpose , and will be referred 
to later as a part of a larger discussion dealing with 
Ian Ramsey, we must still attempt to analyze some 
significant functions that are more fundamental. 
Willem Zuurdeeg is qUite interested in bringing the 
Emalyticc�l oach into 2 correct per2.-�,ecti ve by shol":-
i that 18ngu2.ge uust necessarily t2ke the human 
situation into account. As stated earlier, the human 
s i hl.2ti on is intrinsic211y included in the languEg'e 
situation. With this understanding in nd, \i\'e should 
no t vi ew l'el 1.Q'i ous lanG2.1lPge as indicat:i ve 1 8nG2.uage. It '--- -.. -' '-.-' ,-- -'..-
is much more correct to refer to it 28 convicti on sl 
12nguage that is deeptly rooted in the personality. 
(�nY'.Ul' C,+1' o n !:< l I e: ' n c'u '-' C'e l' '" """" J .. .1 V V - \,.A. ..l.. \_-. b G.. b '-' also tnat which involves 211 
of re81ity (mo. r:ot merely sc i enti f i c fo.ets. In a ddj.-�-
tio.p. Zl.l.urdeeg pOints Otlt another inl 'lort C:1.nt consiclerE.tion 
by distinguishing between the lenguege f' o� sys tem2.ti c 
theology enG. convictional language. Th e L.onguage of 
systematic theology E.G opposed to cOl1victional ls.ngu age 
is something we manipulate, not something th&t grasps us. 
In all honesty Zuurcieeg concludes by saying tha t  
convictional l ang uag e expresses that IFrhich is rea] fOl' 
a cert a in individual. He I'ebels ag ainst me taphysics as 
all analysists do; and therefore, he re jects any trans­
subjective or transcendental ob j ec tiVity 'I'/hich this 
lan�uage attempts to express. He fails to go beyond the 
si tuati on v:ihich i s �al fo.£. them. In true exi sten tie.l 
fcsilion (Zuurdeeg includes existentialism Decause it 
frost adequc=:. tely emphe8 i zes the analysi s of the human 
situ � tion �hich in turn is an in tegral Dart of the 
1 anguc,g e 8i tU2 ti on.) he sees re i ty as reI a ti ve to ·'-l'.1)1'18n8 •. 
For this rEason l angu age must also be relative. This 
rules out metaohyaics or any refer en c e  to fundamental 
realities. To merely state that something is real for 
them rev e als a fun ction tut this function doe sn l t include 
a claim to a reality th2t is ulti�ate and to which all 
men must respond with their ole being. This type of 
language se ems to function in an exc lusive manner. It 
G .. rc;-'J';s attention to IDEm, not to tile community c'nd an 
obj ective cosmos which are t he clai�s of religious 
1 an.gl1ag;e. 
Alasdair kac Intyre draws attent ion to the function 
of wyti.1. By myth 211 expresses :1is vieVI of real being. 
The essentiEl reEli ty v';lj,ch y'e csnnot j ustify but to 
which the myths refer requires our commitment to an 
authority. Theism does not res t upon firm epistern o -
logical foundEtions. The mo�t si�nificant point for 
the theist "is commitment to belief in these myths as 
"'10"�e ti'Rn l'��I�ul or 1·r�J s.· I.J."1·rl·11)r;:.·.· b�·t()rl· e ",.1I( 48 ) r, .L J .le- , A;::,t:; ' . '_ J. _, WhEt mekes 
one reli gion 6iffer i' rom another is the authori ta ti ve 
cri teria e.ccepted h,Y pnd for this self-commi tment. This 
u ltimate criteria is the only means of j ustifying onels 
c 0111111i tment. Mac Intyre emph2si zes that because it is [.;.n 
ultimate criterion it is not possible according to the 
very definition to be j ustified; it is its own criterion. 
In brief, re l i gi on 12cks any means of justification. 
Although there is a history of aDologetics which 
is i�tegr81 to the hi s tory of theistic thought, this 
does not seem to refute Mac Intyre's proposal that it 
i s  not v21id. Just becstise there is a definite tradition 
of historical apologetics thEt has attempted to j usti fy 
itself before objective criteria of reason 2nd evidence 
c Intyre is wrong. Apolo�etic8 m2Y 
COine up �'ith 80::1e sif:,:nificar�t rE,mifiC2,tion,s full of 
t this can not be the zain or unioue 
function of theolo�i c ?l 12 usgs. It is no t t most 
bESic method of Dointin� out the essential ele� e nt of 
.1" ".' 
--
cornmi tment. J��pologetic8 LOE:t often aEEu:nES comn:i trnent. 
( I "" t' " t  t' -71 II " n aaUl Ion we (;11;n qucs Ion b e rre s lQea tho t vve 
l1lust convert our 12.n�'u?,g'e ,not instead of argument, 
but for the sake of me8ningful er�'Ulnent, l:ecminf:ful 
e.rgument seems to imply a po ssi ble justi ficati on 
through reason and evidence. This is precisely what 
Mac Intyre i s  trying to ahow i s  i mpossible. ) 
Ian T, F81nsey in Reh. gl,ous LEni2uc'i2e dr2'I,vs our 
attention to the importance of the logical oddness of 
t heologi crl IFnguage. The wain thes i s  of his book is 
that the servi ces performed by an analysis directed from 
the pers�ective of logic a l empiricism shall be very 
beneficial to philosophy and theology , The empir ical 
plaCing of theolo�ic21 phreses 11 not o nly be the 
grounds of a nev' coo:per2.tion, .'ou t a new v e nture 0.1 togeth-
er. His two lYle.in que s tion s 2Te, tl1?'!h?,t it' ;:: reli ous 
situotion?" and IIWhrt kinO. of empiriC e,nC!10T2.g'e hEve 
t heal o';,i c � l lJ::ords? II 
Ramsey believes the foundation of the reli�ious 
situstion is discernment. Discernment i nvolves a break-
through. He illustr�tes this state of affairs oy dis-
t inguishing between types of �nowing. When we �nOTI 
:f 2 C t S 2. b au t t BertT2nd 
Rus8el� termed IIknowledge of description." In 
to this type of kno�ing, t here is the knowi taat 
i t i  0):  
involves personal association and trust ( kenne n ). 
m' • f-" , .J- '  " '  • . h' t" 1nro'::.gn ·1.JL11S a8soc12 1,,1 on 9 ana. K no'vvl ng L .1S pel'son nrougn 
your being known by him in the same sense, there is a 
sudden (h8closure. The inai vidual th2t you previ ous-
ly �:�new only through the channel of fact s becomes a 
'persont• Ramsey refers to this disclosure as a "break-
ing of the ice". This disclosure does not add any facts 
to the many facts alrec)(iy �{novm. The fund.amen tal 
difference comes through the "encounter which brings no 
new facts but rathel' a ' per s on' i nto focus. If This 
personal encounter is not psychological in so far as 
ttey would r e duc e religion to what would be called a 
subj ective experience. 
"Let us emphasize, without any possibility of mis-
understanding, that all these situ 8tions , all these 
characteristically different situations, when they 
occur, have an objective r ef erence and are, as all 
Situati ons, subject-object in structure. When sit-
uati ons "come alive", or the "ice breaks", there is 
obj ective d.epth in t hese situa t ions alon� with and 
c,longside :cr�y subjective ch e nges . ,,(49) 
In addi ti on to an odd di scernrnen t, there is a 
response of total commitment which is the second n�rt of 
a religious situation. When we try illustrating the 
different types of commitment s uch as mathematical 
comll1i t::�ent 2.nd voc2tionEcl eamui tment we ree;o.ily see 
thct all of our eXEJ'n�)les refer nat to whet religious 
commitment actually is but only what it is like. It 
is only what logically corresponds to religious 
language. For example, we iznow a man who is tt'�vrapped 
up" in sailing. Hi::: commitment to Bailing causes 
his everyday 18 "iJ,age to "l.;(� c ol ored by it. This 
c ommitment carries over into all £le Beys and (5.06S. 
When committing ourselves to a lover, we organize 
the \1whole of OUT life around another be ing. I t ca uses 
a personal revolution. This is where personal 
commitment goes beyond the mathematical options which 
-,L' nvol_vp- n o  }le8rt c e�r '-" 11' 1'<0' _ � /. .' '- '" 0.. t..a "t:,. 
nso v'J6 E.�ee religioU2 cornmi tment as ci total 
commitment to the whole universe; something in relati on 
to v:lli. e11 ergUlnen t h2_2 only a very odd fUx-let i on, its 
;mrpose bein�' to tell such a tRle as evokes the insif:';ht � 
the 'disceI'nment' fr om �hich the commitment follows as 
Q response.n ( 50 ) 
In addition, our religioi.:i.8 commitment is bound up 
i n  Ley 1J':O]�d8 o 8e 10 c re se:"bl es the 1 o::-;i c of 'Fiords 
used in describing person':?l and fll2tl:eln2tical commi tment. 
I t has "key-words suited to whole lob " of li vin�?:-
'apex' While it may resemble other 10 cal 
uses of linguistics} it is obj ecti ve len 
been fs'iven very s�JeciE.l qU6.ltficC:ctions. It is cpjective 
lenz?;u8ge U.18.t revea.ls Iflogical irn:o ropriety ". ',"!e qU2lify 
religious la.nguage to s t re s s that its reference is in 
p6.rt beyond the 1 Engue g:e in V':hi c11 it 1 s cl othed. II The 
same i2 true a.bout "God"; 2.nd the central problem of 
theology is how we use, how to qualify, observational 
l anguage so 2 .. 2 to be suitE.ble currency for VI'h2t in pert 
exc eeds it - the 8i tUE ti ons in whi eh theoloQY is f ound-
'1' hen the ftmeti on of theol ogi ee.l lEng;:u2.ge is 
to evoke discernment 2nd commitment throu�h the use of 
objective words that exhlbit 10gicEl peculiarities but 
refer to 6. religious s i tu a tion with objective reality, 
It is a currency for discernment. 
One of the ill2ny eX2m�les of logtcal impro iety is 
the topographic�l oddness. This involves lnv· rting 
COmG2S, hyphens, or capitEl letters to otherwise 
stl"ai tfonV21'd'ixords. EX2111ples of t;:�ts would be 
I authentic. or I :)eing-in-c.-si tuc=tion:t. Anothe r 
oc'i.dness is gs.ined by usin:z ",orCls "technicBlly" in e_ 
sense t t it is never Cefined at one point but is used 
ency so t t it is defined in its use or it 
in 11G8". An exerq')le of this ']I'ould be 
( ,::rq the VitOI'd ifexistentiel". v,-" 
Ian Orombie in }i"laith En�ic stresE�es 'the id.ea 
tr12,t th e ol ogic el lan;::uage functions 2.8 2.n establishr:lJent 
of a "reference rangel!. Thus it functions Hby elimin2t-
ing all improper obj ects of reference ( like finite things 
or empiric21 events) from theistic discussions and by 
suggesting the realms of non-theological discourse 
( e thical, historical, cosmological, and so on ) t o  which 
t�eol ogical speech is someh ow relevant.,,(54) We then 
see th2t the logical 11 oddnessfl of the olof.'�ical speech 
functions in a sem2ntical fe.shion. This 12.n;;:'uage does 
take on si�;nificE,nce because of its reference. Parables 
bec ome more significant and through them we fin d the 
real meaning of words in a real theological context. In 
the context of the pE�rable t hey have their appropriB.te 
!1reference r If c:nd !:lOS t adequately funct ion as 
t heolog'ical languElge. Crombie beli e ves th2.t all 
language a.bout Goe, must be some. v,-ay used in a p2ra.Dolic 
setting. But the parable is n ot th2t TIith which we stop. 
For the Christian the p�rable points to reality teyond 
itself. ThE truth to which the pErables witness does not 
correspond literally to th&t which is referred to in the 
perable. It is the trust of the Ohristi2n th,,,t as a 
reliable parable we ere not misled as t o  its real 
s ignificance and actual reality . Crombie goes a s tep 
beyond Mac Intyre's logic of sheer witness. He does not 
Simply say ti18t this is a reliEble parcble or im e 
b ecause the believer is impelled to believe it. 
Instead Crombie concludes by developing the idea 
thc:d through our const2,nt att empt t o  use imCl.ges, light 
is cast by the imag es and prov ides us wit h  a better 
under standing of the reality to which the image refer s. 
Th e idea tb.at "logical ;In;ages are capo.ble of i.llwnin2.ting 
one's understanding of the world," give s  a new and v ital 
significan ce to theologicE.1 18n�:;-uage. Th e idea thet 
II illimin8.tion" is as sig'nificant as II inmuls10n" TJrovides � � � 
a ne·w j ustification and makes a further inv estigation of 
ima g e s  or analogi es r elevant. 
The main purpose of this section has been directed 
toward a functional anal�sis of theological language. 
Unfortunately the analysis has b rought to our attention 
me.ny different functions the IEngu2.ge may serve but has 
still not disclosed any conclusive discernment of a 
reali ty to 1Nhich this 18.ngu2ge is r ef erring. Though 
the language may s erve various functions we still do 
not i:now if the la.112uE)ge is the n&tur21 expressio n of an 
experiential reality that c laims a r esponse of our 
entire personElity. 
SU8c�.nne L er, in ll.er -0001<:, Philoso�o)1Y in a. NevJ 
K.sz., at tell::pts to lnak e an honest analysis of the types, 
ouali ti e8, or differer:t level s of lingui sti c cOn1rDunicat-
ions. Her main emphasis is the demarcat ion made between 
discursive and presentational languag e . 
According to Professor L anger , 12.nguage is related 
- to re21i ty by means of the "law of proJection". To 
some people only discursive language, that which is 
language put in peculiar order, can be spoken. There is 
express ion in a different sense which refers to feelings, 
emotion, and ('1.esires. This lang'u2ge does not repI'esent, 
but expresses. This " ge nuine type of s emantics " goes 
beyond cme fills in the gaps of discursive lang11age 
which is not the only articulate form of symbolism. (55) 
Her main as sumpt ion is 11 v:herever symbol operates, there 
is meaning. , (56) It is important to notice that 
flpresentationEcI sema.ntics" ( Does "sem2.nticst! here rnean 
the same thing it dOES for the l ogical positivists? ) 
is not c onc e l ved through lE.nguage; but after having been 
experienced, it is preserved 'in an attitude and gains 
expression through interpl2cy wi th other aspects of 
experience. The �ost highly developed form of 
connotational semantics is anIsic. 
But there still remains a cert e .. in vagueness con-
c erning the abt Ii ty of lan,; u e ge to comniu.ni C2.te the 
r eligi ous re211ty. When employi l2.n;[u e to 
awareness or participation in the reality . But with 
religious langurge, as we analyze it , we fe�l once 
r-� ,..., C)":: � 
removed froffi the reality; and therefore, a vague 
or hazy communic(?tion is sensed by almost every one. 
Then we b egin to question "If/hether the lanf';uage is EtC-
tually communic8.ti.ng any reali ty at all. I f ther e is 
a reality, its meaning and significance seem to have 
transcended the analysis. The primary question seems 
to be, "How can we communica te through language a 
transcendental subject?" 
John A. Hutch1.nson in his article, li The Religious 
Use of Language" expresses the thought that religion 
condensed to its very essence involves symbols for the 
ultim2te meaning of hurt:2.n exlstence. This reali ty 
which is then communi cat in a symb�lic manne� iB )r� 
pre. 58 hm ano. fu,l:t' i l1men t in the symbol s. Hutchin son 
states that reli gious statements are anologic2l 8 .. nd 
Analogy is the only means -r ' 0':: COl'lTrYlUnl-
eating the re �ty of the transcendental object. As 
Professor Paul Hessert pointeu" 011.t I' n c lect'lTe ' _ 0. ' v" _ _  , an 
a.noloc,J':'v is an idenb t'Jl of l'eLo.tl' 01'" o"nlr1 nn-f.. O'I" p:"' ''' e '''' '''' e _._ - - -" _ . •  _1.> . --'0,,;_",\,; '. 
The bravery of a boy is not that of a man, but there 
De a relation bet�een their br2ve�v . . , - " "  Religious 
langu e is poetic?l or iyr;c�in(-·tive. Such. religiJus 
images eTe (5.1 ff erenti E te6 fr on') c once-o t :3 by their 
immediacy. After explaining thi s poi nt in more 
�etail, he defines a religious experience as bein0: 
hit by such i mEges and responding to them. His third 
and fourth point are tha t this language must express 
ultimate meaning, that which is independe nt of and 
gi ves meaning to all other concerns, and thc.t it i 8 
referring t o  a unique obj ect that can be indic2t�d 
but not defined. It is a holy languc:ge. In sl�m8ry, 
he believes th2.t religious l an gua ge ha.s an ernoti ve 
meaning that is t ak en existentially. 
NOYt thB.t we hB.ve been exposed to the area of 
symbolism, let u s  pursue the intere s t further. "In 
man's search for what it mean s to be and to stay 
hurna.n, b.e returns perenni8.11y to syrnbolB for the 
expression of ultimate eani This stateC1ent 
is �ade in the Editor's Preface to t he September 1955 
ample intro&lction to P aul Tillich1s thoughts is his 
C:cl'tlcle, "Helisions Symbols Our Knowledge of God". 
Tillicl1 begins by r ec ogni zing tl1st the logical 
posi ti vists have helped (f1D.}:e us a·7s.re tL12t 'Tv'e :"lC1Ve no 
and explicitly states that levels of rFality exist 
and these levels are different. Each level demands 
a different 1. 
r; r" (:) ;.�'. It 
2nd interprets religiou8 l�nguage as being essentially 
symbolic. 
A sign indicAtes the existence of something be-
yond itself. It is 0ne aspect of a larger whole ( e,g. 
smoke is one E_spect of the fire), and our re21 concern 
is with the "pointed to" r eality. A symbol is also 
employed to represent some reality although it . ...  IS no" 
a proxy for that reality. Both the sign and the symbol 
point to something beyond thernsel ves bu t s igns do not 
participate in the meaning and 90wer of that to which 
it is referring as symbols do. 
" Every symbol opens up a level of r eality for 
which non-symbolic speaking is inadequate.H ( 58 ) The 
symbol is then a representation that opens up a level 
of l' eEtl i ty other:,i se hidden and u nabl e ta be grasped 
in any other manner. For Tillich, the opening-up 
p rocess involves the opening up of reality in deeper 
1 evel S 2J'J.d the open ing-up of the inner m2n in speci al 
levels. It opens up re21ity 211C_ the soul. Thus the 
s ymbol brings us to a new dimension of life. A sign 
such as the stop light is invented and can De repleced 
by a different li�tt, but a symbol has a special 
function. Each symbol serves for one specific function -
it cannot be repl�ced. Symbols are the result of a 
situation; they 2_re born out of 2. group that 
ackno�ledges in a wora, a flag or any specific symbol 
a part of their being. en the inner situation or 
conviction dies, the sym bol dies. A symbol is born 
2no. die s but is rot invented. The question he seems to 
beg is, "By what criterion will �e judge between symbols 
if they represent an ultimate re2lity'!? If the symbol 
dies it is because the situation dies. Are there Bny 
abiding o::c u.l tima.te 
situation die? 
. 1 - t' symoo s 2no can uoe rel:L ous 
Religious symbols open up II the de pth dinJ.ension of 
reality itself, the dimension of reality which is the 
ground of every other dimension and every other depth, 
and which therefore, is not one level beside the others 
but is the fundamental level, the level below 211 other 
levels, the level of being it self , or the ultimate 
� _ (i:\O) power OI being." �0 These svmbols o'Oen the eX1)erience '<" .. . : -'. 
a i' the dim ensi on of tl"l.i s depth in the huma.n s oul. S yrllbol s 
arE born and �ie according to the changed relEtionship 
with the ultimate ground of being - God. The Ground of 
Being transce nds 2ny symbol. If a symbol should be 
taken as uneon6itional it is Cemonie. 
There are tViO Irmdamental levels in all rellglous 
(� E' i-1-· � J.. • .  :: .. vl.lc trc:.n 2C encien t level and the immf?nen t 
1 eHE).l i 
, J V _'..L. I • The most basi c symbol on the transcen tel 
level Dou�t be the Ground of Bei 
taat his is only 1J.ncondi tional ground of being? 
The EWE1'eness of tilE :c e ali t.y is not symb oli c , but in our 
relat.ionship we must symbolize - and the relationship is 
experienced only as we encounter him �ith the wholeness 
of our being which is a p e rson , a being. That element. 
which is infinite and unconditional, yet transcendental, 
2nd th at which is adequate to knowing him through a 
person relationship are the t.wo E s s ential elements 
th&t 2.l·ways J:lUSt be fOrEtYlOEt in our transcend.ental 
symbols. The attribut.es anct the ccts of God are also 
includ.ed under transcendental sumbols. ThE second level, 
the immanent lEvel, involves the level of the divine 
in time and space. Under this section Tillich discusses 
thE:� i ncarna.ti on, sacrament s, s1gn- [;'ymbols. 
Tillic�-:, concludes his Erticle v!i th his ideas con-
cerning the truth of religious symbols. Symbols are 
indepenC'.ent of any empirical cri ticism. A symb ol is 
alive &s long as the situation out of which it was bOTn 
still I1E8 signific2J1ce. "Their truth is their ed.equacy 
to the religious situation in ch they are oreated, and 
tiH';ir ins.G.equacy to another sj tuntlor; is their un­
f ,::'C \ 
truth."\u '/ Ai:sc'.in l:"j.E conclusion lec'(;,s to relativism unless 
he intended s reference to "situation" to iIply ultimate 
situation. Even if this is what he i�tended, it �ould 
s 8em to be r�e8_so.:""li circulus in nTobando. The absolate 
----_ ....... "--
statement concerning the truth is thet no symbol is 
ul ti11l2te. No symbol can take the pls.ce of the 11  tim2te 
wit hout becoming demonic. No matt er what the symbol 
might be, it is conditional and must deny the ic:olatrou8 
tendency vii thin itself. The cri te rion for s.ny Cb.ri stiall 
syubol is its c larity in representing or being a concept, 
but not the thing in it self. 
I 2 sure that Fe �ould agr ee with Thomas Aquinas 
and Pmll Tillicn that God can never be an obj e c t of the 
i!lind. 
e d 13.8 
In inv estimation most of our langu2.<2:e i8 construct-
v "_...' t..�. 
a result of objects we expe rience being able t o  
become obj eets of the mind end thereby becoming' concept-
UEeli zed. It i E: conceivable ths.t analogi cal lEmguage 
which doss not refer to the essence of two objects but 
rather a relation thEt exists betwee n the obj e cts night 
be the only vay of overcomi this barrier of communicat-
ion throu;:)1 reli CUE? lc;n 2.ge. It seems trv�t most 
cOiilnmnication involves concentuel lang uag e 2nd Dot a 
perceptual leD age. We a1'8 able to form a concept of 
a t ree; end because other hUrrJ2,DS h 2"ve e xperienced a 
tree end it is possible to h2ve Ee tree as an obj ect 
in c:� (;j.2,lo[J.1.e t;;8 r821:L ty of the tree. Such thin&-;s as 
love and attituCe seem to be excluded from the cate ies 
of those t:1i s T;�1ich are or CEn the obj ect of our 
mind. Therefore, unless it is possible t hrough anal ogy; 
they seem to also be excluded from the possibility of 
being communicat ed by l2,nguE)ge as we l<:now it today. 
Even if we are able to use anological 1&n�u8ge to 
communica,te a reali ty betvieen thos e '\"ho have alreE,dy 
experienced the reality, the question still remainij, 
IIHow are we to communicate tilis reality by 8,noloST,ical 
I anguage or communi,cate it in e. ny menner to those who 
have no t experienced such 2,n encounter? If 
Geddes �dac Gregor in his .article "The Nature of 
Religio us Utterance" brings to the surface the idea 
t h2t the failure of theological commtmications is not 
necessarily failure in the use of language (assuming 
1&n;:;;;u8&;e is cc�pable of expr essing all realities). It 
is more often a symptom of confused standpoints. By 
the word "standpoint" he means the presuppositions and 
types of q'tlestions to which they give rj.se and the 
outlook on things which result. ( 61 ) Professor H. A. 
believes that each st2ndpoint has a language; and 
1,.1'hen the 18.ni�uEge8 are confused , it is rr,erely a 
symptom of confused standpoints. He forsees that 
philosophy will become a standpoint analysis, not a 
Such a philosophy will require 2� 
Uh�erst�nding of the standpoint it considers, a certain 
'7f", 
: \ • .> .. 
sense of a dramatic study $ a di alectical approach) a 
normative structure so as to allow a jUdgment between 
standpoints and will provide an existential j udgment. 
But again I feel that we must point out that an exist-
ential choice must be made. The quest i on still remains, 
" How does one make the choice?" It seems we make a 
choice by being grasped or confronted by a reality. And 
the Christian problem involves the ability to communicate 
the rea lity to others. The central problem with which 
we started still remains - "Can we use 12.nguage to 
communicate ultimate reality?" Some people would reply 
that all the Christian can do is trust that their vJOrds 
will be a wi tnes s t o  the reality and thereby give the 
reality an opportunity to reveal itself. Or s ome will 
agree viTi th Mac GI'egor that t heological statements only 
have meaning as they are put liturgical form o r  
some imperative form. 
In this paper a study has been Ii12.de of tradi tional 
ontolo§7, contemporary philo sophy , types of verifications, 
and types of analyses. It has involved a preoccupation 
�ith s emantic s and religious reality, No matter what 
ideas mi t have seemed to be the answer at one time, 
we cannot escape the conolusion that the i ntended 
semantic reference of theological discourse is to an 
ontological reality. This h28 been and seems to be the 
71. 
main conviction of Christians. 
In way of conclusion, let us thi nk for a momen t  
about the Se rmon on t he Mount (I.l8.tt. 5:1-7:29) or the 
Lord's Praye r (E8tt. 6:9-15). In ei the r o ne of these 
stateme nts Je sus was using l anguage to communicate 
ul tim2.te re E,li ty. And Christians today repe 2.t and pray 
the m in order thet the re ality might be communicate d  to 
the me n of this gene ration. Le t us t ake both of the se 
statements and view them in the light of this e ntire 
papeI', We might conc lude thc:,t these statements have an 
ontological re fere nce . Undoubte d ly those ' who have never 
e xperie nced such a re ality wou ld attempt a ve rific ation 
of the refere n ts. Othe rs would analyze t he various 
functions or attempt to find logi cal cohere nce in the 
statements. Some would say that these statements 
se rve as an e mo tive or e thical function. Others would 
say they serve a ·c'espcmbl\j,;;� or imperative function 01' 
would make c:malytic2.1 §;;eme s out of the se se rtous 
endeavors to communicete reali ty, Still others would be 
driven back to a standpoint-analysis which appears to 
offe r a be tter Goln ti on than 2.ny 0 ther i 801 at ed method. 
In all fairness I think we woulo. edrd t that these 
statement s  of Jesus and other religious statements do 
provic1e a basi EO of communica ti on for Ollri st ie.n8 toc,ay. 
But keeping in mind thst the good news of gospel is 
for those who have not experienced such a reality 
( the lost sheep) . we need to question whether language 
was Jesus ' �ost effective way of communicating this 
rea.l ity and whether it is our most effective me.nner. 
Most basically we n eed to E;sk vvhether it was the 
language that opened up new levels of reality for thos e 
who heard Jesus speak or whether it was possibl y 
cou�unicated more effectively in some other manner. 
According to the gospels, Jesus' most effective communi-
cation r:BS his e.uthority, and his authority wa.s whet 
he started and increased. In Qther wordS, Jesus' real 
communication was by 'what he did, no t hi s language. 
In conclusion, two �ain ideas have evolved 
through this paper. Different types of reality are 
opened up througl1 dj.fferent types of lansuage - the 
vB.rioue functions of t.l1eological 12.n�tuE'ge 2,S ve 
found them. The other idea is that lang'u2ge is in­
adequate E�nc, certainly not the most effecti ve m2�nner 
of communicating ultim8te reality. What a meln is and 
does is more able to COr11II·;unJ.· ca,.te t' It' t - . he u lm& e reality 
of the hum2n situation. 
T o (�",\!', we �r' r ' Y' ' M  -�..r 'v ' a. e 1>1 seeren 01 a c,or e tn tell ectual 
unders tanci  and commun i cation of the ultimate 
real i ty. Tb , : reE' eo� for- in t:coducing' the i�ospel 
the conclu�in� thoughts was because the Christian who 
m�kes rel l g lous statements, �hether he be theologisn, 
minister, or an every day ly;an, must j ustify his 
communication according to his one model - Jesus the 
Ohrist. This i s  t he one criterion of his ontology and 
its manner of communication. 
The problem is still with UB and I am certain 
always will be in future generation. "Can we 
communicate ult imate 1'e8.1i ty?" Is it possible th2.t a 
new understanding of what language is, how it functions, 
2,m:l whEt it is capable of communic8.ting 1;yill allow man-
kind to communicate ultimate reality? Or is language 
inadequate and we must seek a more effective manner of 
c ommunica ting ul tim2.te reali ty? Or :tight ree1l comm-
unication of ultimate reality only become a reality 
after both altern�tives are simultanecu sly developed 
to thei l' u tmo s t? It seem.s pla.usai:.'le the. t the real 
solution to our problem rests with a better under"t"ndin� . .  1 .  "" 0 . .  " ' 0 
and proper us e of language and a more thorou;'h inves tig-
Etian of non-linguistic means of communication! Only 
the energetic and vitally concerned will provide 
oontemporary theology and philosophy with guiding 
ir'csi��hts. 
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